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COMMENT
Old Wine in New Bottles:* The "Marital"** Rape
Allowance***
I. INTRODUCTION
The marital rape exemption' is the common law doctrine that pre-
cluded the prosecution of a husband for raping his wife.2 This unqualified
immunity was based on the notion that, by the very act of marriage, a wo-
man irrevocably consented to intercourse with her husband.3 The exemp-
tion bestowed upon husbands an absolute privilege to rape their wives,
using whatever degree of force or coercion they pleased.
4
For more than a decade, the marital rape exemption has faced mount-
ing opposition.' Some commentators have criticized the immunity as vio-
* "Neither do men put new wine into old bottles: else the bottles break, and the wine
runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are
preserved." Matthew 9:17 (King James).
** The quotation marks signify that the so-called "marital rape exemption" no longer
applies exclusively to married men in many jurisdictions, but now includes cohabitants and social
companions as well. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
*** The term "allowance" signifies the movement away from granting husbands the absolute
right to rape their wives (traditionally classified as the marital rape exemption) toward permitting
such behavior only in particular circumstances. See infra notes 116-35 and accompanying text.
Appropriately, the dictionary definitions of "allowance" include the following: (1) "to
supply in a fixed or regular quantity," (2) "an imposed handicap," and (3) "an allowed
dimensional difference between mating parts of a machine." WBSrM's NnrrH NEw
COLLEGIATE DIcrioNARY 72 (1983).
1. Except when referring to the "marital rape exemption" as a legal doctrine, rule, or philos-
ophy, the term "wife rape" is more accurate and descriptive. Using "marital rape" ignores the
reality that a majority of rapes are committed by men (and husbands) against women (and wives)
and implicitly diminishes the importance of this point
2. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
4. SusAN EsTRicH, REAL RAPE 72 (1987).
5. See DIANA E. RussELL, RAPE IN MARmAGE xviii (Indiana Univ. Press 1990) (1982).
Criticism of the exemption, however, is not new. Though often cited, John Stuart Mill's
eloquent words are worth repeating:
[A] female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right, and is considered under
a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the wife: however
brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to-though she may know that he hates
her, though it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impos-
sible not to loathe him-he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a
human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her
inclinations.
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lating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.6
Others have argued that laws condoning wife rape are inconsistent with the
contemporary social status of women7 and that they contradict the prevail-
ing trend of the law to accord women greater reproductive freedom and
bodily integrity.8
Responding to these arguments, several courts have abolished the ex-
emption or refused to recognize it in any form, granting single and married
women ostensibly equal rights to state protection from sexual assault.9
Many courts, however, have not directly addressed this issue, and a few
have been unwilling to overturn the exemption when presented with the
opportunity. 1° Given the small number of wife rape cases that come before
appellate courts," advocacy groups have turned to state legislatures to abro-
gate the exemption by statute.
John S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEx EQuAIr- 123, 160 (Alice S. Rossi ed.,
1970). As a caveat, it should be noted that female slaves in "Christian countries" were not always
able to exercise the right Mill described. See infra note 71.
6. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 passim (1990); Anne C. Dailey, Note, To Have and To Hold:
The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1255 passim
(1986).
7. E.g., Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEmNiSM 207, 249 (1992).
8. E.g., Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAm. L. 559, 578
(1991) (citing, inter alia, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-31 (1992) (striking down the spousal notification
requirement in Pennsylvania's abortion statute); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (rec-
ognizing a woman's right to choose abortion).
9. See Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Rider, 449
So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (Ga. 1985);
People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702,712-13 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 467 (111. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 (Mass. 1981); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38,
45 (NJ. 1981); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985).
10. See People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (holding that the state's interest
in preserving familial relationships provided a rational basis for the marital exception in Colo-
rado's first degree sexual assault statute); People v. Hawkins, 407 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Mich.) (re-
fusing to declare unconstitutional Michigan's marital rape exemption as it then existed), modified,
413 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. 1987).
11. Rape is among the most underreported and unprosecuted of all crimes. ESTRCH, supra
note 4, at 10; see also Augustine, supra note 8, at 577 & nn.99-101 (citing crime statistics from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation). As the Supreme Court noted in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, "(i]f anything in this field is certain, it is that victims of spousal sexual assault are ex-
tremely reluctant to report the abuse to the government." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
That few marital rape cases are brought to trial should not be considered an indication that
the actual number of marital rapes is equally small. See infra note 47.
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These efforts at reform have met with considerable success, and most
states have abolished the traditional exemption.' 2 Throughout this process,
however, significant resistance to abolishing all laws distinguishing be-
tween marital and nonmarital rape has persisted, 13 leading a number of ju-
risdictions to replace the traditional exemption with what might instead be
termed a "marital rape allowance."' 4 In general, the allowance creates a
lesser crime for wife rape than for other rapes.' 5 Under the new allowance
laws, husbands no longer enjoy an unqualified privilege to force their wives
to engage in nonconsensual sex; nonetheless, states adopting such laws
maintain the legal right of a husband to rape his wife under certain circum-
stances.' 6 Because married women in these jurisdictions remain unpro-
tected from some forms of sexual assault, the reform effort must continue.
This Comment first discusses the traditional rationales on which the
marital rape exemption is based and explores the justifications offered by its
contemporary proponents. 17 Second, the Comment examines the major ar-
guments against penal laws differentiating between marital and nonmarital
rape.'" Next, the Comment reviews recent modifications to the marital rape
exemption and offers possible explanations for the development of the mar-
ital rape allowance.' 9 The exemption's history in North Carolina is then
12. According to the National Clearinghouse on Marital and Date Rape, every state now has
laws criminalizing marital rape. See Marylou Tousignant & Carlos Sanchez, Woman Who Muti-
lated Husband Had Told Neighbor of Rapes, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1993, at D5; Foon Rhee,
Marital Rape Law Approved in N.C., CHARLoraE OBSERVmE, July 2, 1993, at 6A. However, at
least 31 states have maintained distinctions between marital and nonmarital rape by placing addi-
tional legal burdens on victims of wife rape. Tousignant & Sanchez, supra, at D5.
For a state-by-state survey of marital rape law, see RussELL, supra note 5, app. II, and Au-
gustine, supra note 8, at 578-85. The inherent difficulty in making definitive classifications
should be noted, however. The status of the law in many jurisdictions is ambiguous because states
with no statutory exemption for husbands may still recognize one under common law. See, e.g.,
infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's common law treatment of
wife rape). The relatively small number of cases testing these statutes and the subtle but often
critical distinctions among them contribute to the complexity of making an accurate
categorization.
13. One of the more extreme statements defending the exemption is a quotation attributed to
California State Senator Bob Wilson: "But if you can't rape your wife, who[m] can you rape?"
Michael D. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape?": The Marital
Rape Exemption Re-examined, FAm. L.Q., Spring 1981, at 1, 1.
14. See supra note ***.
15. Often, a greater degree of force is required before nonconsensual intercourse with one's
spouse is considered rape. Some states simply make the punishment for raping one's wife less
severe than that imposed for raping another woman. See infra notes 120-29.
16. See infra notes 116-35 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 48-108 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 109-53 and accompanying text.
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examined as an illustrative case study.2" Finally, the Comment argues that
complete abolition of all laws distinguishing among rape and sexual assault
victims based on their relationship to their assailant is required in order for
women to achieve equal protection under the law.21
II. A TRADrTON OF WIFE RAPE: THm MARrrAL. RAPE EXEMPTION IN
LEGAL HISTORY
According to its common law definition, rape occurred when a man
"engage[d] in intercourse... with a woman not his wife; by force or threat
of force; against her will and without her consent."22 The origins of this
definition are usually traced to Matthew Hale's assertion that "[tihe hus-
band cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."23 In mod-
em terms, this doctrine is most often referred to as the "implied consent
theory."'24 Its basic premise is that raping one's wife is an impossibility, as
she has consented to sex with her husband through the act of marriage. 5
Another traditional legal justification offered in support of the exemp-
tion is the so-called "unities theory." This doctrine contends that "the hus-
band and wife are one person in law," with the "legal existence of the
woman... suspended during the marriage."26 The following Georgia stat-
ute, not repealed until 1983, is a typical codification of this purported unity:
"The husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her
legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except insofar as the law
recognizes her separately, for her own protection, for her benefit, or for the
20. See infra notes 154-88 and accompanying text.
21. See discussion infra part VII.
22. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 8 (emphasis added). This definition is still the cornerstone of
contemporary rape law. Id.
23. 1 MATrEw HALE, HISTORY OF THm PLEAS OF Tr= CRowN 629 (Dublin, 0. Lynch 1778).
It is noteworthy that this far-reaching pronouncement was simply a "bare assertion" by Hale, in
contrast to his typical practice of citing to supporting authorities. Freeman, supra note 13, at 13.
Michael Freeman postulates that, "[gliven [Hale's] views about women[,] it cannot.., be ruled
out that he did, indeed, create the marital rape exemption rule." Id. (emphasis added).
24. The Model Penal Code notes that marriage, or an equivalent relationship, implies a "gen-
eralized consent" that is "valid until revoked." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1985).
25. In fact, some matrimonial law is inconsistent with Hale's notion. Freeman, supra note
13, at 15. For example, a wife's refusal to have sexual intercourse with her husband is not gener-
ally considered grounds for divorce, and courts have held that a husband has the "duty of forbear-
ance. .. at the reasonable request of the wife." Id. at 14-15 (purporting to quote Hines v. Hines,
179 N.W. 299 (Mich. 1920), but actually using language from Martilla v. Quincy Mining Co., 191
N.W. 193, 194 (Mich. 1923)).
26. 1 WnL.AM BLAcKsToNE, CoMmARmS *442.
MARITAL RAPE
preservation of public order."'27 If one accepts the premise that a wife's
civil identity is subsumed into that of her husband, it follows that "a man
could no more be charged with raping his wife than .. .with raping
himself."28
The legal status of married women as the property of their husbands
was also used to justify the common law marital rape exemption. As one
court noted, "the purpose behind the proscriptions [against rape] was to
protect the chastity of women and thus their property value to their fathers
or husbands."'29 Given this justification, there is no reason to punish those
rapes not diminishing a woman's value as property, because no injury to the
proprietary interest of the relevant male "property owner" has occurred. 0
The historical view of marriage as a contract has likewise been viewed
as supporting the marital rape exemption. Traditionally, a marriage con-
tract was virtually irrevocable, especially for women, and sex with one's
husband was an inescapable obligation under it. At least one state main-
tains a statutory requirement that a husband and wife have sexual inter-
course before their marriage is deemed legally valid.3 ' Accepting the
premise that sex is an established right pursuant to any marital relation-
ship,32 the contract rationale, which approaches Hale's irrevocable consent
doctrine, interprets the rape of one's wife as the mere exercise of a contrac-
tual right.
33
In addition to the traditional legal theories discussed above, more con-
temporary justifications have been offered in support of the marital rape
27. See Act of Mar. 29, 1983, No. 516, 1983 Ga. Laws 1309 (amending GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-3-8 (Michie 1982)).
28. Augustine, supra note 8, at 561.
29. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 576 (N.Y.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
30. See SusAN BROwNMmLER, AGAiNST OuR WILL 163 (1975); Dailey, supra note 6, at 1256
("mhe law protected a father's [property] interest in his daughter's virginity and a husband's
interest in his wife's fidelity.").
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1(3) (Miechie 1991), construed in Brown v. Car, 402 S.E.2d 296
(Ga. App. 1991). Both the ability to contract and an actual contract can also be explicit require-
ments for a valid marriage. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1 (Michie 1991).
32. Recognizing that the terms of a particular "marriage contract" need not include
sex-upon-his-demand, or even sex at all, feminist commentators generally have objected to the
unequal positions occupied by men and women engaged in the "contracting" process, not to the
notion of a contractual relationship per se. See, e.g., Michael J. Gonring I, Comment, Spousal
Exemption to Rape, 65 MARQ. L. R-v. 120, 124 (1984); see also CATKARwE A. MAcKiNNON,
TOWARD A FoamnST THEORY OF THE STATE 175 (1989) ('The law of rape presents consent as free
exercise of sexual choice under conditions of equality of power without exposing the underlying
structure of constraint and disparity.").
33. The contractual obligation to engage in sex with one's husband and the marital rape
exemption are mutually reinforcing. One implies the other. If the law recognizes that a wife can
be raped by her husband, then she is relieved of any enforceable obligation to engage in sex with
him. Similarly, if a wife has no duty to engage in sex with her husband, then she can be raped by
him.
19931
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exemption. One such position is that wife rape is less serious than other
rapes. In one wife rape case, the defense lawyers argued that "the emo-
tional trauma suffered by a person victimized by an individual with whom
sexual intimacy is shared as a normal part of an ongoing marital relation-
ship is not nearly as severe as that suffered by a person who is victimized
by one with whom that intimacy is not shared."34 This assertion is ques-
tionable; it is at least as plausible to argue that victims "feel as or more
traumatized from being raped by someone known or trusted... than by
some stranger."
35
Another argument that exemption proponents have used successfully
builds on the widespread fear of false rape claims.36 Exemption supporters
worry that false accusations would damage the reputation of those men un-
justly accused37 and that fabricated claims could become a potent weapon
for a vindictive wife during a divorce or custody proceeding.3" This fear,
34. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 10, People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981) (No.
81SA102), quoted in MAcKNNON, supra note 32, at 177. The Model Penal Code espouses the
view that "[t]he character of the voluntary association of husband and wife, in other words, may
be thought to affect the nature of the harm involved in unwanted intercourse." MoDEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1985).
35. MAcKrNoN, supra note 32, at 177.
36. As with so much of rape law, the classic articulation of this fear is attributed to Hale:
"Rape is ... an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by
the party accused, tho never so innocent." 1 HALE, supra note 23, at 635. Wigmore is responsible
for a similar statement: '"he real victim... too often in such cases is the innocent man ...." 3A
JoHN H. WIGMORE, EvmawcE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a, at 736 (Chadboum rev. ed.
1970).
The use of the term "prosecutrix" to describe the victim in a rape case is indicative of this
attitude, because it implies that a vindictive woman is out to punish the defendant. See, e.g.,
KmNrN=i S. BROuN ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 158 n.10 (John W. Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992); Joseph Neff, House Votes to Revoke Centuries-Old Law Allowing Marital Rape, Nnws
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 7, 1993, at IA ("Is the unsupported testimony of a prosecutrix
all that is required to send [a rape case] to jury trial?" (emphasis added)). Likewise, the term
"alleged victim" is consistently used by the media to describe women claiming to have been
raped. In contrast, individuals claiming to have been the object of some other crime frequently are
accorded a degree of credibility denied to rape victims by being labelled simply "victims." Few
consider that a supposed robbery "victim" may be running an insurance scam or (to use an ex-
treme example) that a supposed murder "victim" may have committed suicide. Cf. Susan Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1126 (1986) ("Ihe law puts a special burden on the rape victim to
prove through her actions her nonconsent .... while imposing no similar burden on the victim of
trespass, battery or robbery.").
37. For example, North Carolina Representative Hugh Lee stated: "I don't care if he's as
innocent as the baby Jesus, that stigma will follow him the rest of his life .... This bill [abolish-
ing the exception] is promoting great mischief." Neff, supra note 36, at 1A; see also Joseph Neff,
Marital Rape Bill Vexes Senators, NEws & OBsaRvER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 23, 1993, at 3A
(quoting members of the North Carolina State Senate).
38. Brief in Support of Answer in Opposition to Prosecutor's Application for Leave to Ap-
peal at 17, People v. Hawkins, 407 N.W.2d 366 (Mich.) (No. 80436) ("[The charge by a spouse
in the context of marital discord provides a much stronger basis to suspect hostile motives to make
exaggerated or false claims."), modified, 413 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. 1987).
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however, is unfounded: there is no evidence indicating that married women
are more likely to fabricate false claims than unmarried ones.39 Indeed, the
social pressures against accusing one's husband of rape may in fact make
claims of wife rape, legitimate or otherwise, less likely. In any case, reli-
ance on this argument as the basis for a marital rape exemption (or allow-
ance) clearly places the protection of the husband's reputation above the
protection of his wife's right not to be raped. Such concerns are absent in
other areas of criminal law. "[I1]f the possibility of fabricated complaints
were a basis for not criminalizing behavior, virtually all crimes other than
homicides would go unpunished."'
Some commentators and legislators have also worried about the impact
on "marital stability" if the exemption were to be abrogated.4 The concern
underlying this argument is that permitting wives to charge their husbands
with rape would unsettle marital relationships, foreclose the possibility of
reconciliation between spouses, and cause increased strife within families.4 2
Marital harmony is undoubtedly a worthwhile social goal, but as the
Supreme Court of Virginia noted:
It is hard to imagine how charging a husband with the violent
crime of rape can be more disruptive of a marriage than the vio-
lent act itself. Moreover, if the marriage has already deteriorated
to the point where intercourse must be commanded at the price of
violence we doubt that there is anything left to reconcile.43
39. See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984) ("IbMhe possibility that married
women will fabricate complaints would seem to be no greater than the possibility of unmarried
women doing so."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
With what might be characterized as half-hearted support, another court responded to this
fear with the observation that there was "no basis for believing that a vindictive spouse is more
likely to fabricate a sexual assault charge than a vindictive former lover." People v. M.D., 595
N.E.2d 702, 712 (1l. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 467 (M. 1992).
Overall, the number of false rape charges has been estimated at two percent, the same rate as
for other violent crimes. BROWNMI.LER, supra note 30, at 387.
40. Liberia, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
41. See John D. Harman, Consent, Harm, and Marital Rape, 22 J. FAm. L. 423, 431 (1984).
42. During legislative debate over the exemption, North Carolina State Senator Sandy Sands
observed: "The institution of marriage is taking a whipping here .... What we're doing is taking
one more step to eroding what I consider the building block of this country, that is, the family
relationship, the husband and wife." Neff, supra note 37.
43. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984). In even stronger lan-
guage, the court also concluded that "[tihis argument is absurd." Id.
The Weishaupt decision is unusual in that it upheld the conviction of a husband for raping his
wife without rejecting the marital rape exemption outright. The court held that a wife could
"unilaterally revoke her implied consent to marital sex" by "mak[ing] manifest her intent to ter-
minate the marital relationship by living separate and apart from her husband; refraining from
voluntary sexual intercourse with her husband; and... conducting herself in a manner that estab-
lishes a de facto end to the marriage." Id. A concurring opinion cautioned that "the flood gates
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Implicit in the use of marital harmony as a justification for the marital ex-
emption is the idea that reconciliation between the rapist and his victim is
more important than the victim's right not to be raped in the first place.
This set of priorities is hardly appropriate for a system that endorses the full
and equal dignity of women.
At a deeper level, arguments in favor of the marital rape exemption
reveal that the exemption is consistent with the traditional status of women
in our society." Throughout our legal and cultural traditions, woman is
either virgin or whore, alternatively someone to be placed on a pedestal or
in the bedroom. Catharine MacKinnon observes:
The law of rape divides women into spheres of consent according
to indices of relationship to men .... These categories tell men
whom they can legally fuck, who is open season and who is off
limits ....
... Virtuous women, like young girls, are unconsenting, vir-
ginal, rapable. Unvirtuous women, like wives and prostitutes, are
consenting, whores, unrapable.45
The husband's traditional role was that of protector. As such, he re-
ceived unqualified entitlement to sexual relations with his wife.46 Through
the marital rape exemption, the law embraced this traditional relationship,
recognizing that such an arrangement contravenes the very notion of wife
rape. In so doing, it left married women vulnerable, apparently presuming
that an appropriately protective husband would not abuse his commensurate
sexual privileges. Unfortunately, extensive evidence of wife rape indicates
that this presumption is dangerously mistaken.4 7
have not been opened for the prosecution of husbands for the alleged rapes of their wives." Id. at
856 (Compton, J., concurring).
44. See MAcKNNoN, supra note 32, at 42 ("Unequal marriage laws ... began by 'recogniz-
ing the relations they find already existing between individuals."' (quoting Mill, supra note 5, at
130)).
The marital rape exemption is also consistent with some elements of the Christian tradition,
particularly the letters of the apostle Paul. From I Corinthians 7:4: "For the wife does not rule
over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body,
but the wife does. Do not refuse one another ..... " From Ephesians 5:22: "Wives, be subject to
your husbands, as to the Lord."
45. MAcKNNoN, supra note 32, at 175 (emphasis added).
46. Compare Blackstone's comments articulating the legal unity of husband and wife:
"Mhe very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband under whose wing, protection, and cover,
she performs everything .... 1 BLACKSTON, supra note 26, at *442 (emphasis added).
47. In one study of 930 women by Diana Russell, 12% of those who had ever been married
were raped by their husband or ex-husband. RussE.L, supra note 5, at 64-65; see also DAVID
FINKELHOR & KERsn Yu.o, LICENsE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 6-7 (1985) (noting that
one out of ten wives has been sexually assaulted by her husband at least once). A 1992 report
indicated that 9% of all rapes were committed by husbands or ex-husbands. NATIONAL VIC'n
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m. A CHANGING VIEW OF WOMEN: ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE EXEMPTION
Particularly since the early 1980s, the marital rape exemption has
come under increasing attack.48 In addition to the objections mentioned
above, commentators and courts have recognized that these laws are an "an-
tiquated holdover from an earlier and discarded view of women."'49 While
itself a fairly recent development, the movement to abolish the marital rape
exemption is the latest in a progression of reforms to improve the legal
status of women. In general, a wife is no longer the legal chattel of her
husband, "to be used as he will[s]." 0 (Of course, the obvious exception to
this is wife rape in those states adopting a marital rape allowance.) Passed
in some form by all states, mostly during the second half of the nineteenth
century, Married Women's Property Acts helped reform the common law
status of women by granting them an independent legal identity.51 Among
other changes under these laws, women gained the rights to contract, to sue,
and to own property.52 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,13 which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by certain employers, was an-
other step in the progression toward gender equality. The continuing will-
ingness of the United States Supreme Court to uphold a woman's right to
choose abortion, in the midst of considerable controversy, is also an indica-
tion of the enhanced legal status women recently have achieved.54
Another criticism of the marital rape exemption is that it violates the
constitutional right to privacy recognized by the United States Supreme
CENTER & CRIME VICrMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CENTER, IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE
NATION 4 (1992).
48. See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 30, at 380-82; EsTca, supra note 4, at 72-79;
Augustine, supra note 8; Freeman, supra note 13 passim; West, supra note 6 passim; Dailey,
supra note 6 passim; Judith A. Lincoln, Note, Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First
Step in Protecting Married Women from Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1219 passim (1989);
Sallee F. Waterman, Note, For Better or for Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. Ky. L. REv. 611 passim
(1988); see also cases cited supra note 9 (overturning or refusing to recognize marital rape
exemption).
49. West, supra note 6, at 49; see also McConnell, supra note 7, at 249 ("[lf Hale's rule
had any validity at the time he articulated it, this has long since eroded.").
50. McConnell, supra note 7, at 248; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980)
("Nowhere in the common-law world-indeed in any modem society-is a woman regarded as
chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recogni-
tion as a whole human being.").
51. LEo KANoWrrZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THm UNFInsHmD REvoLuriON 40-41 (1969).
52. E.g., IowA CODE § 597.1.19 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
54. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2804 (1992) (reaffirming the "right of
[a] woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interfer-
ence from the State"); cf id at 2826-31 (striking down Pennsylvania's spousal notification re-
quirement as an undue burden on a woman's right to choose abortion).
1993]
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Court 5 5 -both the privacy rights of married women in particular, and of all
women in general.56 A state cannot limit this right, which protects bodily
integrity, reproductive freedom, and individual autonomy, unless a legiti-
mate state interest necessitates governmental interference." Since no such
interest is furthered by laws exempting wife rape,58 the state arguably vio-
lates the privacy rights of married women by "extinguish[ing] [their] au-
tonomy in one of the most personal and intimate of all human
interactions."5 9 The fact that rape sometimes results in an unwanted preg-
nancy adds even more credence to this argument. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,6"
the Court noted: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."6' By legalizing an activity that may
cause conception, the state unjustifiably infringes on that decision and vio-
lates the privacy rights of married women.
The argument that the privacy rights of all women are violated by the
marital rape exemption implicates the right to marry, which the Supreme
Court has recognized as fundamental. 62 The requirement that a wife-to-be
relinquish state protection from sexual assault could be considered a "sig-
nificant interference" with this right, thereby meeting the established stan-
dard for invalidating such a classification in the absence of an important
state interest.63 In effect, the marital rape exemption requires women either
to forfeit their rights to bodily integrity, individual autonomy, and procrea-
tive freedom, or to forfeit their right to participate in a social institution that
55. See, e.g., id. at 2805 ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.").
56. Dailey, supra note 6, at 1262-67.
57. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
The Casey plurality criticized the post-Roe opinions holding that regulations limiting abor-
tion rights "must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a
compelling state interest." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (citing
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983)). Nonetheless, in establishing
its new "undue burden" test, the plurality emphasized the necessity of at least a legitimate state
interest. See id. at 2820 (plurality opinion).
58. See infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text. In the context of equal protection, the
New York Court of Appeals has held that laws distinguishing between marital and nonmarital
rape were "unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny." People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,
573 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
59. Dailey, supra note 6, at 1263.
60. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
61. Id. at 453.
62. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967).
63. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
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the Court has described as "noble" and "sacred." 6 In jurisdictions protect-
ing wife rape, these rights are mutually exclusive-presenting women who
wish to marry, but who desire state protection against sexual assault, with
an impossible, and arguably unconstitutional, dilemma.6'
In addition to violating privacy rights, exemptions for wife rape may
implicate the Thirteenth Amendment as well.66 Although no court has relied
on the Thirteenth Amendment in declaring the marital rape exemption un-
constitutional,67 one can make a plausible argument that laws exempting
wife rape violate this amendment, which provides that "[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States."
6 s
Though some commentators have equated the subordinate status of (white)
women to that of African-American slaves,69 whose plight the amendment
was primarily intended to address,7" the analogy is unwarranted. The cir-
64. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), the Court noted:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.
65. Exemption supporters have argued that the right to marital privacy is actually furthered
by the exemption, and that the state should not regulate what they consider to be intimate matters.
See Augustine, supra note 8, at 570; cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807
(1992) ("Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."). Taken to its extreme,
this argument could be used to justify the legalization of spouse abuse, child abuse and neglect,
incest, and other common forms of domestic violence.
In one recent wife rape case, an Illinois court explicitly recognized that the right to marital
privacy does not apply outside the context of consensual marital relations. People v. M.D., 595
N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ill. App. CL), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 467 (1l. 1992). Thus, the right to
marital privacy is not implicated in the case of wife rape. See id. In Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961), Justice Harlan noted: "[iWt would be an absurdity to suggest either that offenses may not
be committed in the bosom of the family or that the home can be made a sanctuary for crime." Id.
at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion,
84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 504 n.102 (1990); McConnell, supra note 7, at 247-51. Laura X, who
founded the National Clearinghouse Against Marital Rape in 1980, regrets that courts have not
been more responsive to Thirteenth Amendment arguments against the exemption. Ms. X adopted
her last name "to protest the legal ownership of wives by their husbands." Telephone Interview
with Laura X, Director of the National Clearinghouse Against Marital and Date Rape (Jan. 4,
1993).
67. Generally, cases declaring specific exemptions unconstitutional have done so on equal
protection grounds. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
68. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
69. John Stuart Mill, not known for his sensitivity to racism, wrote: "Marriage is the only
bondage known to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house."
Mill, supra note 5, at 217.
70. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872).
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cumstances facing African Americans under slavery were materially
worse.71 While married women-even those living under a marital rape
exemption-are not slaves, the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against
involuntary servitude may be applicable to the situation of battered wo-
72 7men, many of whom are also victims of wife rape. 3
In a 1992 article, Joyce McConnell argues that some abusive intimate
relationships constitute "involuntary servitude," potentially subjecting such
behavior to criminal sanctions under the Thirteenth Amendment's enforce-
ment provisions.74 Citing statements by framers of the amendment that it
could alter the traditional marital relationship between husband and wife,75
McConnell concludes that the amendment was intended "not only [to for-
bid] the legal ownership of human chattel (slavery), but [to prohibit] any-
one from treating another as if such ownership existed (involuntary
servitude). 76 If one accepts this argument, there are many examples of
sexual abuse and brutality by husbands against their wives that might qual-
ify as involuntary servitude.77
71. At least during the time of slavery, white women were in many ways the "chattel" of
their husbands. Their status as second-class citizens, however, provided rights and privileges
denied to African Americans. The primary advantage enjoyed by white women over those truly
enslaved were the benefits attending their unique proximity to the dominant social group-white
males. As a caveat, it should be noted that African-American men probably received more protec-
tion from sexual violence than white women, see Mill, supra note 5, if only because of the perva-
sive social ethic against homosexual behavior. Black women, however, were almost entirely
unprotected from rape by white men, which occurred on an epic scale. For an account of rape in
slavery, see BRowNMiLLER, supra note 30, at 153-70.
72. Lenore Walker defines a battered woman as someone in "an intimate relationship with a
man who repeatedly subjects.., her to forceful physical and/or psychological abuse." LENoRE E.
WALKER, THE BATrERE WOMAN SYNDROME app. B at 203 (1984).
73. See RussEaL, supra note 5, at 61 (citing two studies finding that over one-third of bat-
tered women are raped by their husbands); see also LmoRE E. WALKR, TERRIFYINo LovE:
WHY BArERED WOMEN KILL AND How Socury REsPONDs 124-35 (1989) (describing incidents
of sexual abuse that resulted in the wife killing her husband and the legal system's response to this
situation).
74. McConnell, supra note 7, at 251. The federal criminal involuntary servitude statute is
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1988).
75. McConnell, supra note 7, at 215-16 & n.38.
76. Id. at 220.
77. For a graphic judicial account of the horrors to which one abusive husband subjected his
wife, see State v. Everhardt, 392 S.E.2d 391, 391-92 (N.C. 1990). This case is an excellent exam-
ple of the legal extremes to which a marital rape exemption can force sympathetic courts. Since
North Carolina at the time did not criminalize the rape of a cohabitant spouse, see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27.8 (Supp. 1992), amended by Act of July 5, 1993, ch. 274, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws,
the State instead prosecuted Frank Everhardt for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury. The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld Everhardt's conviction by concluding that the
"1serious injury" element of the charge (which could not include the rape itself) could be satisfied
by mental injuries, despite the court's prior limitation of the term to "physical or bodily injury."
Everhardt, 392 S.E.2d at 392-93.
MARITAL RAPE
Successful criminal prosecutions under enforcing statutes reveal that
"involuntary servitude" is a concept based on the existence of physical or
legal coercion. It typically includes violence or threats of violence and may
involve forced prostitution or domestic service.7" In equating these cases to
the situation confronted by battered women, McConnell notes that batterers
use violent and coercive techniques "to effect total domination" over their
wives.9
In support of her thesis that some abusive spouses may be punished
under the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude, McCon-
nell cites reform in the law of marital rape.80 Although her beliefs regard-
ing the extent of reform may be exaggerated,8' the basic premise of her
argument is still worthwhile. Since "[tlhe law has evolved away from
treating private sphere crimes, such as battery and rape, differently from
those committed in the public sphere," it would be "unreasonable to con-
tinue to limit the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively to public sphere con-
duct" (i.e., the type of economically exploitive relationships that have
historically generated Thirteenth Amendment claims).82 It follows that, at
least in the context of an abusive relationship rising to the level of involun-
tary servitude, wife rape could give rise to a constitutional claim based on
the Thirteenth Amendment. Since this amendment, unlike the Fourteenth,
is not limited to governmental action,83 the Thirteenth Amendment has the
potential to become an especially useful vehicle in victims' efforts to en-
force their constitutional rights.84
78. See Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873
(1945); Bemal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672
(1918); United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
Joyce McConnell notes that in each of these cases the relationship was initially voluntary,
and that failure to make use of escape opportunities did not preclude the court from finding that a
relationship of "involuntarily servitude" existed. McConnell, supra note 7, at 225-26.
79. McConnell, supra note 7, at 233. Cf. RussELL, supra note 5, at xii (comparing abusive
marriages to "a bondage similar to that of a prisoner of war").
80. McConnell, supra note 7, at 247-51.
81. McConnell speaks in terms of a "national trend," id. at 247, and "the end of the marital
rape exemption," id. at 251. She recognizes, however, that "[s]tates that have abrogated the
exemption have taken differing approaches" and cites several of the partial exemptions that this
Comment classifies as allowance laws. Id. at 248 n.237.
82. Il at 247.
83. The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are intro-
duced with the words "No state shall." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. Laurence Tribe has written, albeit not in the context of involuntary servitude: "Congress
possesses a power to protect individual rights under the Thirteenth Amendment which is as
open-ended as its power to regulate interstate commerce." LAUREN E H. TRINa, AMERCAr' CON-
srrUtroNAL LAW § 5-13, at 332 (2d ed. 1988).
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The most successful legal argument against the marital rape exemp-
tion, 5 and the most persuasive, 6 is also the most straightforward: the ex-
emption violates the equal protection rights of married persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment.17 The Constitution does not prohibit laws making
a distinction based on marital status, but it does require a rational basis for
the distinction." Although this test is generally not a demanding one, 9
there is precedent establishing that laws exempting spousal rape from pros-
ecution fail to withstand even this level of review.9" In People v. Liberta,91
which involved the prosecution of a husband for raping his estranged wife,
the New York Court of Appeals struck down the state's exemption after
determining that laws distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape
"are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny." 92 Observing that "a married woman has the same right to control
85. For cases holding that laws distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape violate
the Equal Protection Clause, see Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986);
Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819, 830 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702,
711-13 (il. App. CL), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 467 (iIl. 1992); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d
567, 573-76 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778
(Wyo. 1987).
86. For two good examples of equal protection arguments against the exemption, see West,
supra note 6 passim, and Dailey, supra note 6, at 1267-72.
87. In its pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
88. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 (1972). "A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' Id.
(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)).
89. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (requiring
only that statutory classifications be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"). However,
because marriage has been recognized as a fundamental interest, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383 (1978), statutes affecting this right may be subject to a stricter standard of review.
90. E.g., People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 712-13 (il. App. Ct.) (holding there was no ra-
tional basis for spousal exemption under Illinois' criminal sexual abuse statute), appeal denied,
602 N.E.2d 467 (Il. 1992).
91. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
92. 1d. at 573. It should be noted that New York's rape law was challenged on equal protec-
tion grounds by Mario, rather than Denise, Liberta. In one of the many ironies of this case, Mario
Liberta argued that the law denied him the right enjoyed by married men to commit rape without
fear of punishment by the State. Id. at 570-71. The court treated Mr. Liberta as "not married"
under the penal statute at issue, since, as it required, he and his estranged wife were living apart
pursuant to an order of protection at the time of the assault. Id. Thus, the most important case
involving the marital rape exemption was initiated by a statutorily "unmarried" man guilty of
raping his legal wife. Yet another irony is the name of the protagonists in this decision, which
means "liberty" in Latin. Finally, the Liberta opinion, which has achieved almost canonical status
among feminist scholars and activists, was written by former judge Sol Wachtler. After resigning
his position as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Wachtler recently plead guilty to
threatening to kidnap his former lover's 14 year-old daughter. Diana J. Schemo, Sol Wachtler Is
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her own body as does an unmarried woman,""3 the court held that New
York's marital exemption violated the equal protection clauses of both the
federal and state constitutions.94
Eisenstadt v. Baird,95 a case not directly involving sexual assault laws,
offers additional support for the position that laws distinguishing between
marital and nonmarital rape are unconstitutional. In Eisenstadt, the United
States Supreme Court held that state statutes criminalizing the distribution
of contraceptives to single, but not married, individuals violated the Equal
Protection Clause.96 The Court determined that there was no "difference
that rationally explain[ed] the different treatment accorded married and un-
married persons." 97
The Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey98 is also indica-
tive of the Court's changing attitude toward the institution of marriage.
While significantly expanding the ability of states to regulate abortion, the
Court nevertheless struck down the spousal notification provision in Penn-
sylvania's statute as an "undue burden" on a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. 99 To justify its holding, the Court relied on extensive sociologi-
cal evidence documenting the widespread physical and sexual abuse of
wives by their husbands. 'I Describing the notification requirement as "re-
pugnant to our present understanding of marriage," the Court acknowledged
its "rejection of the common-law understanding of a woman's role within
the family."'' 1 The Court also observed that "[w]omen do not lose their
constitutionally protected liberty when they marry."' 02 Overall, the Casey
Court's relatively progressive attitude toward the marital relationship sup-
ports the position that laws exempting spousal rape from prosecution cannot
withstand even a rational basis test, and thus violate constitutional norms.
Sentenced to 15 Months, N.Y. TndEs, Sept. 10, 1993, at B1. For an account of the incidents
leading to his arrest, see Lucinda Franks, To Catch a Judge: How the F.B.L Tracked Sol Wach-
ter, NEw YoRKER, Dec. 21, 1992, at 58.
93. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573.
94. Id. at 575. The provisions are located in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and in Article 1, § 11 of the New York Constitution.
95. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
96. Id. at 454-55.
97. Id. at 447. In requiring that married and unmarried persons have equal rights to contra-
ceptives, the Court noted: "Tlhe marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup." Id. at 453.
98. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
99. Id. at 2826-31. The spousal notification requirement was the only one of five restrictions
imposed by the State that the Court found constitutionally impermissible. Id.
100. Id. at 2826-29.
101. Id. at 2831.
102. Id.
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In an apparent effort to be nondiscriminatory, marital rape laws and
exemptions are now commonly framed in gender-neutral terms, forbidding
nonconsensual sex with any person not one's spouse. °3 More traditional
statutes maintain the common law's gender specificity, prohibiting noncon-
sensual sex with any female not one's wife."° Since both types of exemp-
tion involve a distinction based on marital status, the rational basis
requirement discussed above is applicable to each, and exemptions of both
types consequently fail to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In the case of the gender-specific exemptions, however, an even
stronger equal protection argument can be made. The Supreme Court has
held that legislation treating women and men differently is subject to a
heightened level of scrutiny far stricter than the rational basis test usually
applied to gender-neutral statutes. 5 The Court has mandated that such
laws must "serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."' 06 As discussed above,
courts have held repeatedly that the governmental interest in exempting
marital rape cannot withstand even a rational basis test."0 7 When a height-
ened level of scrutiny is triggered by a gender-specific classification, the
exemption's failure to meet the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantees is even more apparent. Because gender-specific laws differenti-
ating between marital and nonmarital rape appear to serve no important
governmental objectives, and because there is no basis for such a distinc-
tion, a state with a gender-specific exemption for marital rape unconstitu-
tionally denies its citizens the right to "equal protection of the laws."' 08
103. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a) (1988). In general, this Comment discusses the
marital rape exemption and allowance in gender-specific terms because, despite the pretense in-
herent in the statutory modifications, the impact of spousal rape falls almost entirely on women.
104. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985). Although most contemporary exemptions use
the term "spouse," the offenses to which marriage is a defense may still be defined in gen-
der-specific terms. For example, § 18-6107 of the Idaho Code provides, subject to certain excep-
tions, that "[n]o person shall be convicted of rape for any act or acts with that person's spouse."
IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). Section 18-6101, however, defines rape
as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female." Id. § 18-6101 (emphasis added).
Thus, even a facially neutral exemption may in fact apply only to husbands.
105. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
The level of scrutiny applied to such laws is lower than that applied to laws differentiating on the
basis of race, however. Compare Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)
('Racial and ethnic distinctions are inherently suspect . . . .") with Craig, 429 U.S. at 197
("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives.").
106. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
107. See cases cited supra note 85; see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
108. As one critic noted:
What possibly could be less rational than a statute that criminalizes sexual assault, and
punishes it severely, unless the victim and assailant are married? What could be more
obvious than the plain fact, repeatedly documented, that these state laws are derived
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IV. FROM EXEMPTION TO ALLOWANCE: "REFORM" IN THE LAW OF
MARrTAL RAPE
The marital rape exemption went largely unchallenged from the time
of Matthew Hale until the late 1970s.1°9 At that point, substantial opposi-
tion to the exemption surfaced, largely in conjunction with, and in response
to, the efforts of feminists to reform rape laws generally.' 10 These efforts
led to significant developments in the law of marital rape during the 1980s.
In several noteworthy cases, courts completely abrogated the exemption.'
l
The most prominent of these was People v. Liberia,"2 in which the New
York Court of Appeals held that laws distinguishing between marital and
nonmarital rape violated the Equal Protection Clause.'1 3 Although a few
courts adhered to legal tradition by upholding sexual assault laws contain-
ing spousal exemptions,"' most appellate courts addressing the issue were
willing to abrogate, by judicial fiat, laws differentiating between marital
and nonmarital rape.": In contrast, state legislatures adopted a more
favorable stance toward laws distinguishing wife rape from other sexual
assaults. Though most legislatures did away with the exemption in its tradi-
tional form, many adopted some form of limited exemption or allowance
instead.
The most common method by which states altered the traditional ex-
emption was to declare that husbands and wives living apart were not con-
sidered "married" for purposes of their rape statutes. 1 6 Several states
initially required a judicial decree or some type of official separation or-
der,"17 but most states using this approach now require only that the hus-
from a sorry history of discriminatory, misogynist, and hateful denials of a married
woman's legal right to equal dignity and respect?
West, supra note 6, at 45-46.
109. See Augustine, supra note 8, at 564 (citing People v. De Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506,511
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983)).
110. See ESrRICH, supra note 4, at 80.
111. See cases cited supra note 9.
112. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
113. Id. at 573; see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Liberta
court's analysis.
114. See cases cited supra note 10.
115. See cases cited supra note 9.
116. Virtually every state maintaining a statutory immunity now makes some distinction be-
tween cohabiting and separated spouses. Pennsylvania's law is one example: "[The exclusion
shall be inoperative as respects spouses living in separate residences, or in the same residence but
under terms of a written separation agreement or an order of a court of record." 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Supp. 1993).
117. For example, South Carolina originally required that the parties be living apart pursuant
to a court order before the exemption became inapplicable. Act of June 13, 1977, No. 157, § 8,
1977 S.C. Acts 332, 335. In 1991, this statute was amended to protect only those husbands not
"living apart' from their wives. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-Op. Supp. 1992).
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band and wife live in separate residences before the exemption is
inapplicable.1 ' Other states, even those criminalizing wife rape under par-
ticular circumstances, continue to use the traditional dividing line of a legal
marriage in determining whether or not a particular sexual assault will be
subject to prosecution." 9 Such statutes mean that even women who have
initiated legal proceedings to terminate their marriages are legally unpro-
tected against sexual assaults by their soon-to-be ex-husbands.
Another common approach taken by legislatures modifying the tradi-
tional exemption has been to create a distinct crime of spousal rape. 120
Under these statutes, the punishment for assaulting one's wife is often less
than that for an equivalent assault against another woman. 12' For example,
Arizona treats spousal sexual assault as a class six felony,' 2 2 while other
sexual assaults are class two. 23 The presumptive sentence for the latter is
one year, while the former invokes a five year sentence. 24 Furthermore, in
cases of a first offense for spousal sexual assault, "the judge has discretion
to enter judgment for conviction of a class [one] misdemeanor with
mandatory counseling."'"
Another typical practice is to alter the traditional exemption by
criminalizing wife rape, but only when a spousal rapist uses a degree of
force greater than that required for nonmarital sexual assaults to be classi-
fied as rape. 126 In some states, this stricter standard has been incorporated
118. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B) (Michie 1988). This statute also provides for the rape
prosecution of a cohabitant spouse who "caused serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of
force or violence." IL
119. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-62 (West Supp. 1993).
120. E.g., id. § 262.
121. For example, under § 264(a) of the California Penal Code, the minimum punishment for
"rape" is three years; "rape of spouse" carries no minimum punishment. Id. § 264(a).
122. The Arizona statute states:
(A) A person commits sexual assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with a spouse without consent of
the spouse by the immediate or threatened use of force against the spouse or another.
(B) A first offense sexual assault of a spouse is a class 6 felony.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (1989), as amended by Act of Apr. 27, 1993, ch. 255, § 27,
1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws.
123. Id. § 13-1406(B), as amended by Act of Apr. 27, 1993, ch. 255, § 26, 1993 Ariz. Sess.
Laws.
124. Act of Apr. 27, 1993, ch. 255, § 10, 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws (amending Aruz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-701(C) (1989)).
125. ARmZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(B) (1989) (amended 1993). Any subsequent sexual
assault of a spouse is considered a class two felony, id., so essentially every husband is allowed to
rape his wife at least once without it being punished as such.
126. See infra notes 127-28.
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into the terms of a newly established spousal rape offense.' 7 Other states
have accomplished an equivalent result by abolishing the exemption for the
most serious rapes and maintaining a spousal exemption for lesser degrees
of sexual assault.'2 ' In a number of states, the heightened scrutiny applied
to charges of wife rape manifests itself in a requirement that a wife report
any sexual assault by her husband within a certain number of days after the
offense.'
2 9
The specific charges from which states protect husbands are often
those based on the victim's incapacity to consent.'30 For example, Alaska
punishes sexual assaults against a person "who[m] the offender knows is
(A) mentally incapable; (B) incapacitated; or (C) unaware that a sexual act
is being committed."'' In 1988, the State, which then recognized no
spousal exemption, established marriage as a defense in these situations.'
32
Similarly, Rhode Island's sole marital exemption applies in those cases of
first degree sexual assault where the victim is "mentally incapacitated, men-
tally disabled, or physically helpless."'133 The logic of this approach is diffi-
cult to follow, since it denies state protection to those women least capable
of defending themselves.
127. For example, under Arizona law, spousal sexual assault is committed upon intercourse
without consent "by the immediate or threatened use of force." Aiz REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1406.01(A) (1989). The general sexual assault provision requires only that the intercourse
be nonconsensual. IM. § 13-1406(A).
128. Compare IOWA CODE § 709.4(2) (Supp. 1993) (establishing a marital exemption for third
degree sexual abuse) with id. §§ 709.2-709.3 (1979 & Supp. 1993) (not incorporating a marital
exemption for first and second degree sexual abuse).
Similarly, § 707-734 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes establishes a marital exemption for inde-
cent exposure, while the other sexual assault offenses contain no spousal exclusion. HAw. REv.
STAT. §§ 707-730 to -734 (Supp. 1992).
129. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that spousal rape be re-
ported to law enforcement within 90 days in order for the offending spouse to be prosecuted); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128(c) (Supp. 1993) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(B) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1992) (30-day limitation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61(B), 18.2-67.2:1(B) (Michie
1988) (10-day limitation). The unusual reporting requirement for charges of spousal rape is pre-
sumably an effort to prevent wives from falsely accusing their husbands. See supra notes 36-40
and accompanying text.
130. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-105(a) (Michie 1987) ("A person commits carnal abuse in
the second degree if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another
person not his spouse who is incapable of consent because [that person] is mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated.").
131. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(3) (Supp. 1992). If a "mentally incapable" victim has been
entrusted to her assailant's care by law, rape is considered first degree sexual assault. See id.
§ 11.41.410(3). Otherwise, intercourse with an incapacitated or mentally incapable person is
treated as second degree sexual assault. See id. § 11.41.420.
132. Id § 11.41.432(a)(2) (1989).
133. R.I. GN. LAws § 11-37-2(A) (Supp. 1992). Strangely, second degree sexual assault,
which is defined using identical terms except that it involves sexual contact instead of penetration,
contains no spousal exemption. Id § 11-37-4(A).
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Statutory rape is another offense from which allowance states fre-
quently exempt spouses.13 4 Assuming that the purpose of nonforcible rape
statutes is to protect children,135 this exclusion makes sense if one accepts
the premise that individuals who marry are capable of making adult deci-
sions about sexual relationships and do not require any special protection.
However, one must question the wisdom of a statutory scheme permitting
individuals to marry at an age when they are not considered competent to
consent to sexual intercourse.
One of the most disturbing legal developments concerning marital rape
has been the extension of the traditional exemption to some unmarried indi-
viduals. Several states have exempted cohabitants from prosecution for
sexual assault, usually to the same extent that legal spouses enjoy immu-
nity.136 Surprisingly, the Pennsylvania statute affords cohabitants even less
protection than that given married individuals. 137 Although neither spouses
nor cohabitants can be prosecuted under the state's rape statute, 138 spouses
are protected under the state's spousal sexual assault provision, which ap-
parently does not apply to cohabitants.
1 39
134. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-403(l)(e) (Supp. 1992) (applying to children under 15);
Act of Apr. 7, 1993, Act 935, 1993 Ark. Acts (amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-104 (Michie
1987)) (applying to children under 14).
135. Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1980) (noting that possible
legislative purposes for a gender-specific statutory rape statute included preventing teenage
pregnancies, protecting girls from injury or loss of "chastity," and promoting certain attitudes
toward premarital sex).
136. E.g., CONN. GEN,. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b) (West Supp. 1993) ("[It shall be an affirma-
tive defense [to certain offenses] that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the
alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of
the legal status of their relationship."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 61-8B-1(2) (1992).
137. "Except as provided in section 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), whenever in this
chapter the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse, the exclusion shall be deemed
to extend to persons living as man and wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship
.... " 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Supp. 1993).
138. The general rape provision in Pennsylvania establishes:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse
with another person not his spouse: (1) by forcible compulsion; (2) by threat of forcible
compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution; (3) who
is unconscious; or (4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is
incapable of consent.
Id. § 3121. Since § 3103, see supra note 137, provides that cohabitants are treated as married
whenever "the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse," they cannot be prose-
cuted under § 3121.
139. Compare id. § 3103 (equating cohabitants and spouses "[e]xcept as provided in section
3128") with id. § 3128 (criminalizing spousal sexual assault).
Section 3128(a) provides:
A person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in sexual
intercourse with that person's spouse: (1) by forcible compulsion; (2) by threat of forci-
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In Delaware, exemption from prosecution for some forms of sexual
assault does not even require cohabitation. The State makes no distinctions
based on marital status in its sexual assault laws, imposing instead a limited
exemption for "voluntary social companions" of the victim.' n Intercourse
"without the victim's consent" is punished as unlawful sexual intercourse in
the second degree,' 4 ' unless the victim was a voluntary social companion of
her assailant at the time, in which case it can be prosecuted only as a third
degree offense.' 42 Similarly, if a rape victim engaged in voluntary sexual
intercourse with her assailant at some point during the twelve month period
preceding the assault, the defendant cannot be prosecuted under the first
degree statute unless she suffers "serious injury."'1 43 Delaware, then, treats
a rape by someone with whom the victim may have had a limited relation-
ship as significantly less serious than the rape of a stranger-thereby carry-
ing the notion of "implied consent" to a ridiculous extreme.
44
V. WHY THE ALLOWANCE?
Hostility toward abolishing the marital exemption by statute may in
part be due to the personal biases of many of the legislators, mostly men,
who have confronted the issue. The question of false rape claims is appar-
ently more important to many of them than the protection of married wo-
men from sexual assault. 45 Sexist remarks by certain legislators during the
ble compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
140. "Voluntary social companion" is defined by statute to mean "a victim who is in the
defendant's company on the occasion of the offense as a result of the victim's exercise of rational
intellect and free will, without trick, coercion or duress." Some exceptions apply to individuals
who are under the age of 16 or who are "mentally defective." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)
(1987), as amended by Act of June 25, 1993, ch. 44, 1993 Del. Laws.
141. Id. § 774 (Supp. 1992).
142. Id. § 773.
143. Id. § 775.
144. The Model Penal Code also adheres to this approach. Section 213.1(1) provides:
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts
serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social compan-
ion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him
sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1985).
145. In the recent debate over the exemption in North Carolina, Representative Joe Mavretic
openly appealed to his male colleagues: 'To the males in this audience, put yourself in a position
with an angry spouse who is determined to get rid of you .... [a]nd she says, 'If certain things do
not occur, I am going to charge you with attempted rape."' Neff, supra note 36, at 1A.
Diana Russell observes:
The relief of most legislators on learning that few women will actually benefit from the
marital rape statutes the lawmakers pass demonstrates the intensity with which they
protect male interests.... Judging from their debates, the hazard of a single bogus
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debates over marital rape laws support this explanation.146 However, since
the judiciary-also male-dominated and presumably subject to the same
personal prejudices-has been more likely to abolish the exemption com-
pletely, this explanation of the reluctance by legislatures to eliminate mari-
tal distinctions from sexual assault laws is not adequate. There may be
other, more fundamental reasons for the present course of development in
marital rape legislation.
First, judges may approach their duty to interpret the law according to
constitutional principles more seriously than legislators regard their obliga-
tion to make laws consistent with the Constitution.14 7 This explanation is
credible in light of the fairly common perception that constitutional inter-
pretation is exclusively the domain of the judiciary, particularly the United
States Supreme Court. ' Of course, the Court is well established as the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.149 Legislators should not ignore
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, which establishes that
"Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
accusation disturbs them far more than all the pain endured by countless numbers of
women who, for whatever reason, cannot seek justice.
RussEL, supra note 5, at xxi.
146. For example, "Damn it, when you get married you kind of expect you're going to get a
little sex." When a Wife Says No .... Ms., Apr. 1982, at 23 (quoting Senator Jeremiah Denton of
Alabama). A few female legislators have made similar statements. Colorado legislator Anne To-
ledo opined: "I think if a woman is having problems, she might abuse it. All of a sudden she gets
tired of him and she yells 'Rape."' RussELL, supra note 5, at xx.
147. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1968) (arguing that legislators are obligated to assess the constitutionality
of legislation); JAmEs B. THAYmE, JoHm MARSHm.L 104 (De Capo Press 1974) (1901) (noting the
inclination of legislatures to "shed the consideration of constitutional restraints .... turning that
subject over to the courts").
Robin West argues for a "pluralistic approach" to enforcement of constitutional rights, with
each branch of government obligated to pursue the Federal Constitution's fundamental principles
within its appropriate sphere of influence. West, supra note 6, at 75-76. Specifically regarding the
marital rape exemption, she argues:
Whether or not the United States Supreme Court or state supreme courts ever rule on the
unconstitutionality of marital rape exemptions, Congress has the power, the authority,
and arguably the duty, to do so, under section five of the fourteenth amendment. Con-
gress could enact a federal law guaranteeing protection to all women against violent
sexual assault. Consistent with rationality requirements, this law would prohibit irra-
tional discrimination against married women in the making and enforcement of rape
laws.
IL at 76 (footnote omitted). The same mandate also could be applied to state legislatures under
the state constitutional provisions embracing equal protection principles.
148. Consider the prototypical secondary school civics lesson that the legislature makes the
law, the judiciary interprets the law, and the executive enforces the law. Though adequate as a
generalization, this axiom cannot mean that legislators should ignore constitutional guidelines
when deciding on legislation.
149. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958).
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visions of this article."' 5 ° Since laws protecting wife rape violate the
amendment's promise of equal protection, 15 1 this enforcement provision
alone should be sufficient to prompt legislative action.
Political considerations may be another reason that legislatures have
been more likely than courts to establish a marital rape allowance. After
the real and perceived successes of the women's rights movement in the
1970s, the 1980s were a time of reaction against women in general and
feminism in particular.'5 2 Less constrained by the necessity of adhering to
a coherent set of legal principles than the judiciary, legislatures appear to
have passed rape laws based on compromises between widely divergent
political views. Reformers worked to abolish all laws distinguishing mari-
tal from nonmarital rape, while their opponents hoped to maintain the tradi-
tional unqualified exemption. Given these conflicting views, it is not
surprising that the legislative process often resulted in statutes that punish
wife rape, but with less severity than other rapes.'
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VI. THE MARrrAL RAPE EXEMTION iN NORTH CAROLINA
The history of the marital rape exemption in North Carolina provides
an illustrative case study. The state first recognized an exemption for wife
rape as part of the common law. In State v. Dowell,'54 the North Carolina
Supreme Court observed that "[a husband] may enforce sexual connection
[with his wife], and, in the exercise of this marital right, it is held that he
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment contains virtually
identical language authorizing legislative enforcement of its prohibitions against slavery and in-
voluntary servitude.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 85-108.
152. See generally SusAN FALuDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR ArAiNsr AMmuCAN
WoMEN (1991) (exploring the political and cultural reaction against women and feminism in the
1980s).
153. One example of such a statute, South Carolina's 1991 spousal battery law, punishes ag-
gravated sexual battery against one's spouse entirely "at the discretion of the court." S.C. CODE
AN. § 16-3-615(A) (Law. Co-Op. Supp. 1992). The equivalent offense of first degree criminal
sexual conduct, defined in virtually identical language but applying only to rapists not married to
their victims, is a "felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than thirty years." lId
§ 16-3-652(2) (Law. Co-Op. 1985). Newspapers reporting on the adoption of this statutory
scheme noted that it was the result of a legislative "compromise." Enthusiasm Low in House for
Spousal Rape Bill, CHiARLOrM OasExvER, Apr. 15, 1988, at 2C.
Legislation is the result of collective action rather than individual decisionmaking. Such a
process can give rise to apparently irrational outcomes, which may not be congruent with the
preferences of any individual within the legislative body. The marital rape allowance, then, may
be an example of Condorcet's Paradox, wherein the rational consistency of the positions held by
individual legislators does not prevent irrational inconsistency in the outcome of their delibera-
tions. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tax. L.
REv. 873, 901-02 & n.171 (1987).
154. 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525 (1890).
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cannot be guilty of the offense of rape." 155 Because Dowell involved the
prosecution of a husband for aiding and abetting the rape of his wife by
another man, however, the language stating that a husband could force him-
self on his wife was dicta. Concerning the behavior at issue, the court con-
cluded that the privilege to enforce "connection" with one's wife "[was] a
personal one only" and upheld Dowell's conviction. 5 6
The assertion in Dowell that a man could not rape his wife except by
aiding and abetting another was repeated by North Carolina courts on sev-
eral other occasions.1 57 In State v. Martin,'58 the court of appeals upheld
the conviction of the victim's husband for assault with intent to commit
rape. The court concluded: "[A] husband is legally incapable of raping his
wife, but may be convicted of the rape of his wife. A husband who coun-
sels, aids, or abets, assists or forces another to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, is guilty of rape." '159
Despite the dicta in Dowell, there is some precedent indicating that the
Martin court need not have concluded that "a husband is legally incapable
of raping his wife" under North Carolina law. At the time, state statutes did
not establish a spousal defense.160 Courts in other states subsequently de-
clined to recognize the common law exemption under statutes similar to the
one in effect at the time of the Martin decision. 6' In addition, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, in the 1920 case of Crowell v. Crowell,162 had
held that a wife could maintain an action against her husband for assault.
The Crowell court based its holding on North Carolina's Married Women's
155. Id. at 723, 11 S.E. at 525.
156. Id. The court was especially sensitive to the rape victim in this case because of what it
described as the "abhorrently simple" facts: the man forced at gunpoint to attempt intercourse
with her was African-American. Id. at 722-23, 11 S.E. at 525. Although he escaped before the
rape was completed, the court was "not prepared to say that, under the circumstances, [he] would
have been excusable had he completed the offense." Id. at 725, 11 S.E. at 526.
157. See, e.g., State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 473, 153 S.E.2d 44, 60 (1967); State v. Get-
ward, 89 N.C. App. 26, 31, 365 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1988); State v. Martin, 17 N.C. App. 317, 319,
194 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1973).
158. 17 N.C. App. at 317, 194 S.E.2d at 60 (1973).
159. Id. at 319, 194 S.E. 2d at 61. The court quoted a statement by Hale initially cited in the
Dowell case: "'For, though in marriage she hath given up her body to her husband, she is not to be
by him prostituted to another.'" Id. (quoting State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 723, 11 S.E. 525, 525
(1890) (quoting HALE, supra note 23, at 629)).
160. This changed in 1979, when the legislature explicitly adopted a spousal defense except
for parties "living separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement or a judicial decree." Act of
May 29, 1979, ch. 682, sec. 1, § 14-27.8, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725, 726-27 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (Supp. 1992)), amended by Act of July 5, 1993, ch. 274, 1993 N.C.
Sess. Laws; see inffra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (Ga. 1985); Weishaupt v. Common-
wealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984).
162. 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
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Property Act, passed in 1913.163 The court concluded this statute "gave the
wife a right to recover damages for injuries to her person, or for other torts
sustained by her, against her husband as fully as against any one else."'"
The following language from the Crowell opinion, which made no refer-
ence to the Dowell case, also supports the contention that North Carolina no
longer afforded husbands legal immunity for wife rape:16
So much of the common law as exempted the husband from lia-
bility civilly or criminally for assaults, slanders, or other torts or
injuries committed by him on his wife is invalid now, both be-
cause it has become obsolete and at variance with the customs
and sense of right, and with our form of government, which con-
fers "equality before the law" upon all, and because it has been
expressly abrogated and repealed by the statutes above quoted
166
The state legislature answered unambiguously any questions about
whether North Carolina recognized an exemption for wife rape in 1979,
when it adopted section 14-27.8 of the North Carolina General Statutes as
part of a broad revision of the state's sexual assault laws.167 Limiting the
common law immunity slightly, this statute permitted the prosecution of a
husband for raping his wife only if the parties "were living separate and
163. The statute provided:
That the earnings of a married woman by virtue of any contract for her personal service,
and any damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be recovered
by her suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate property
as fully as if she had remained unmarried.
Act of Feb. 8, 1913, ch. 13, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 45 (current version at N.C. Gm. STAT. § 52-4
(1991)).
164. Crowell, 180 N.C. at 521, 105 S.E. at 209 (emphasis added).
165. For other cases with language arguably supporting this position, see State v. Way, 297
N.C. 293, 296, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979) ("If the particular act of intercourse was without her
consent, the offense is rape without regard to the consent given for prior acts to third persons or
the defendant."), and State v. Long, 93 N.C. 542, 544 (1885) ("[A]lthough the person ... was
taken first with her own consent, if she was afterwards forced against her will, the offense would
be committed.'). Long involved the rape of a "lewd woman," which "only count[ed] to her
credit, for the fact that a woman is a common strumpet or the mistress of the defendant is no bar."
Id. Way specifically dealt with whether the concept of "withdrawn consent" applied when there
was only one act of intercourse between the complainant and the defendant. 297 N.C. at 296-97,
254 S.E.2d at 761-62.
166. Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522, 105 S.E. at 210. A dissenting opinion expressed concern about
the "radical and far-reaching changes" wrought by the court's decision. Id. at 528, 105 S.E. at 213
(Walker, J., dissenting).
167. As originally adopted, the exemption stated: "A person may not be prosecuted under this
Article if the victim is the person's legal spouse at the time of the commission of the alleged rape
or sexual offense unless the parties are living separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement or
a judicial decree." Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, sec. 1, § 14-27.8, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725,
726-27 (codified as amended at N.C. GrEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (Supp. 1992)), amended by Act of July
.5, 1993, ch. 274, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws.
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apart pursuant to a written agreement or a judicial decree." 168 In 1987, the
statute was amended to dispense with the requirement of a formal separa-
tion, permitting the prosecution of any non-cohabitant spouse.1 69 As origi-
nally introduced, the 1987 legislation would have completely eliminated the
marital defense.170 However, a senate committee radically altered the bill
so that it abolished only the formal separation requirement. 171 The sponsor
of the amendment reincorporating the exemption, Senator William Barker,
expressed the following concern: "Any time a wife gets mad at her hus-
band, she's always going to have this hanging over his head: 'Hey, guess
what you did last night? You raped me."
72
During the 1993 legislative session, exemption opponents once
again introduced legislation to abolish North Carolina's spousal
exemption. 173  Wiser from their 1987 attempt at repeal and aware of
allowance laws adopted in other states, proponents of the measure were,
from the outset, determined to effect a complete repeal of the exemption
and to avoid a compromise.74 Several newspapers 75  and civic
168. Id. As initially proposed in House Bill 800, the limitation specified a "decree of divorce
from bed and board" (i.e., a partial divorce, by which the parties are separated and forbidden to
live together). The legislature subsequently amended the provision to require only a 'judicial
decree." In State v. Getward, 89 N.C. App. 26, 365 S.E.2d 209 (1988), the North Carolina Court
of Appeals ignored this legislative history and overturned a husband's conviction for raping his
wife solely because there was no final order granting divorce from bed and board. The victim had
obtained an exparte protection order and filed a petition for divorce at the time of the offense, but
the court considered these actions insufficient to remove the defendant's spousal immunity under
the statute as it then existed. Id at 31, 365 S.E.2d at 212.
169. Act of Aug. 7, 1987, ch. 742, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1514 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-27.8 (Supp. 1992)), amended by Act of July 5, 1993, ch. 274, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws.
170. Senator Wanda Hunt introduced Senate Bill 751, which would have repealed § 14-27.8,
on May 1, 1987. Hunt described her proposal as "a simple bill that will eliminate spousal claims
as a defense to rape." Marital Rape Bill One Priority of NOW, CHALOTrM OBsERvER, Mar. 17,
1987, at 2C.
171. Representative Joe Hackney characterized the change as "a halfway step toward eliminat-
ing forcible sexual intercourse in a marriage." Jim Morrill, House OKs Spending Limits, CHAR-
L=rra OBsERvER, Aug. 7, 1987, at 2E.
172. N.C. Equity, Marital Rape Legislation in North Carolina 15 (1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). Similarly, Senator Dennis Winner espoused the position that "this
bill overkills the problem by putting ... somebody in danger of a far longer prison term than the
potential damage is to the victim." Id. Ultimately, Senate Bill 751 was approved in the Senate by
a vote of 35 to 7, and in the House by a margin of 81 to 16. Id.
173. House Bill 214 and Senate Bill 251, identical provisions introduced on February 19,
1993, amended § 14-27.8 of the North Carolina General Statutes to read: "A person may be
prosecuted under this Article whether or not the victim is the person's legal spouse at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense." Act of July 5, 1993, ch. 274, 1993 N.C.
Sess. Laws.
174. Interview with Arlaine Rockey, Founder and Co-President of the Association for the
Reform of N.C. Marital Rape Laws (ARMR), in Charlotte, N.C. (Nov. 1, 1992).
175. It's Time to Get Rid of Marital Exception to Rape, GREENSBORO NHws & REcoRD, Dec.
12, 1992, at A18; The Marital Rape Outrage, CHARLOr OBsERvER, Nov. 22, 1992, at 2B.
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organizations' 76 backed their efforts, expressing opposition to laws condon-
ing spousal rape. In April, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
approved the measure without any amendments.' 77 The bill was opposed
only by a "small coterie of lawmakers who raised the specter of vengeful
wives victimizing their husbands."' 78
The proposal faced significantly more opposition hi the Senate, where
legislators attempted several times to amend the bill. 179 In committee, Sen-
ator Dennis Winner proposed treating marital rape differently than other
rapes, with a maximum punishment of fifteen, rather than forty, years in
prison.18 0 Winner later suggested classifying marital rape as a lesser crime
when it did not involve a weapon or "serious physical injury."'' Senators
Don Kincaid and Fred Folger offered two separate amendments before the
full Senate to establish a requirement that marital rape be reported within a
specified time after the alleged offense.182 Each of these attempts to limit
the bill's scope ultimately failed, and the Senate passed the legislation un-
amended, abolishing North Carolina's marital rape exemption by a vote of
forty-four to three.
183
176. ASSOCIATION FOR THE REFORM OF N.C. MARrrAL RAPE LAWS, LisT OF ORGANIZATIONS
SUPPORING THE CoMPLETE REPEAL OF TE N.C. MARrTAL RAPE ExEMPTON (1992) (including
N.C. NOW, N.C. Association for Women Attorneys, N.C. Coalition Against Sexual Assault, N.C.
Council of Churches, N.C. Legal Services, and Planned Parenthood).
177. Neff, supra note 36, at IA. The vote was 106 to 5. Id.
178. Id. Representative Hugh Lee opined: "If this bill is passed, it might be well that if a
husband is having any difficulty with his wife and they decide to engage in sexual intercourse, he
had better have some witnesses present." Id. at 11A.
Some outside the legislature also opposed the bill. For example, Wake Forest University law
professor Don Castleman described the repeal as an "inappropriate and ineffective response" to
the problem of domestic violence. Don R. Castleman, A Sensible Response to Domestic Violence,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Dec. 23, 1992, at 15A. According to Castleman, "where the attacker is
the spouse of the victim, the law should attempt to salvage the relationship and preserve the
marriage.' Id.
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
179. See Neff, supra note 37.
For example, Senator John Kerr expressed concern that "women would use the law to exact
revenge:' Joe Dew, Panel Wants Law on Marital Rape, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec.
19, 1992, at IA, 12A. "By the time you're charged and it's put in the paper, the damage is done."
Telephone Interview with John Kerr, N.C. State Senator (Mar. 17, 1993).
180. Joseph Neff, Senate Vote on Marital Rape Bill Delayed, Nmvs & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 25, 1993, at 3A.
181. Joseph Neff, Marital Rape Bill Survives Toughest Test, NEWs & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 30, 1993, at 3A. Apparently, Winner did not consider the rape itself to be a "serious
physical injury."
182. Rhee, supra note 12, at 6A. Kincaid's amendment, which failed by a vote of 42 to 5,
would have required that marital rape charges be reported within 30 days of the alleged offense.
Id. Folger's amendment, defeated by a margin of 33 to 13, would have required that such charges
be filed within five years. Id.
183. Senators Bob Carpenter, Don Kincaid, and Dan Simpson voted against the bill. Id. at 6A.
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In its repeal of the state's marital rape exemption, the General Assem-
bly of North Carolina also rejected a marital rape allowance. Nevertheless,
the concerns expressed during the debate"'4 and the proffered amend-
ments,185 as well as the failed attempt to abolish the exemption in 1987,186
indicate that the legislative process might have resulted in an allowance.
State legislators-and the women's groups who lobbied them"'8 -should
be commended for rejecting the type of political compromise produced in
numerous other states.1"8
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the willingness of many states to abolish the marital rape ex-
emption and the rejection of a marital rape allowance by some others, the
issue of marital rape offers stark proof that women still have far to go to
achieve full equality. In light of the significant questions about both their
constitutionality and rationality, it is noteworthy that the elimination of
these laws generates such controversy. Furthermore, in a majority of states,
the effort to abolish the marital rape exemption has been only partially suc-
cessful, resulting in a marital rape allowance instead. Unfortunately, the
marital rape allowance is, in most respects, every bit as problematic as the
exemption it replaced.
Both the marital rape allowance and the marital rape exemption are
inherently sexist, in that they elevate men's interests in their reputations
over the right of women to be free from a particularly heinous form of
assault. 8 9 Primarily, these laws reflect the male fear that a vindictive wife
or lover may falsely accuse them of rape. Even if this concern is taken
seriously-and such accusations are rare'90-putting these anxieties above
the right of women to be protected from sexual assault by their husbands is
unjustified, as the trial process offers a clear opportunity to expose such
claims. Indeed, the legal protection afforded the accused is extensive, since
the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, while
184. See supra notes 37, 42, 145, 178-79.
185. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
187. Representative Bertha Holt, sponsor of the legislation, credited its unqualified success "to
lobbying by women's groups, unity among all 31 female legislators, and the influx of younger
male lawmakers." Rhee, supra note 12, at 6A.
188. See supra notes 116-44 and accompanying text.
189. North Carollina Representative Bertha Holt observed: "All they're thinking about is the
potential for men to become victims. They're not thinking about the victims who are out there
now." Dennis Patterson, Attitudes Inching Ahead on Marital Rape, Some Say, NEWS & OBSvnRVE
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 29, 1993, at 3A.
190. See supra note 39.
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the instance of wife abuse, including rape, is known to be high,' 91 there is
no corresponding evidence indicating that false claims of rape are a compa-
rable social problem.'92 Legislation that, contrary to the evidence, places
the interests of men above those of women in this way ignores the promise
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although one might hope that recent developments in the law of mari-
tal rape across the country represent an improvement, this is not necessarily
the case. The common replacement of the marital rape exemption with a
marital rape allowance is, in some respects, a step backwards. While the
marital rape exemption, although dated and sexist, was at least internally
consistent, the marital rape allowance is simply the irrational outcome of
political divisions within our legislative institutions. This irrationality is
most evident in laws that apply the kind of outmoded thinking exemplified
by the marital rape exemption to nonmarital relationships. 93 Rather than
recognize recent changes in the way men and women relate to one another,
these new allowance laws seek to place novel relationships into a purport-
edly discarded framework-perpetuating a system fraught with dangerous
consequences for women.
JAYE SrrroN
191. See supra note 47.
192. See supra note 39.
193. Catharine MacKinnon has written:
As marital exemptions erode, preclusions for cohabitants and voluntary social compan-
ions may expand.... mhe partial erosion of the marital rape exemption looks less like
a change in the equation of women's experience of sexual violation and men's experi-
ence of intimacy, and more like a legal adjustment to the social fact that acceptable
heterosexual sex is increasingly not limited to the legal family.
MAcKNNoN, supra note 32, at 176.
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